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NOTES
PLAIN READING, SUBTLE MEANING:
RETHINKING THE IOIA AND THE IMMUNITY OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
George B. Adams III*
Immunity is freedom from liability, and as such, it can quite literally
provide a “get out of jail free” card. In the United States, international
organizations face uncertainty about the scope of their immunity, which is
provided by the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA). The
D.C. Circuit has found that international organizations enjoy absolute
immunity under the IOIA. Conversely, the Third Circuit recently held that
international organizations are only entitled to restrictive immunity, which
limits immunity to claims involving an organization’s public acts and does
not exempt them from suits based on their commercial or private conduct.
This Note contends that a plain reading of the IOIA, combined with a full
understanding of the history and legislative purpose behind the immunity of
international organizations, presents a third interpretation. It concludes
that the IOIA requires judicial deference to immunity determinations by the
executive branch, which provides the flexibility necessary to allow
international organizations to operate without undue interference.
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INTRODUCTION
In May 2011, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the former head of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), was arrested for allegedly sexually
assaulting a housekeeper in his suite at the Sofitel Hotel in Manhattan.1
Strauss-Kahn decided not to claim immunity during the criminal
proceedings, explaining that “he wanted to clear his name.”2 However,
when the housekeeper later filed a civil suit, his lawyers argued to the court
that his former status as the head of an international organization protected
him from lawsuits, including those based upon “acts done in the executive’s
personal capacity.”3 The court ultimately rejected the immunity claim
because Strauss-Kahn had resigned from his post at the IMF before the suit
was filed, and therefore any immunity that he might have enjoyed had
expired.4 The decision thus left open the question of whether Strauss-Kahn
would have enjoyed immunity had he not resigned. This larger question—
whether international organizations and their employees enjoy absolute or
restrictive immunity under U.S. law—is the subject of a current split among
federal courts.5
Under the so-called “restrictive” theory of immunity, government entities
enjoy full protection for their public acts, but surrender their privilege when
acting as private parties.6 Congress formally adopted the theory of
restrictive immunity with respect to foreign states when it passed the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 19767 (FSIA). However, while the
FSIA clearly limited the immunity owed to foreign states, it does not speak
to the immunity of international organizations.8 Although international
organizations share some functional similarities to foreign states, they are
granted immunity under a separate, older statute—the International
Organizations Immunities Act of 19459 (IOIA)–which, by its text, affords
international organizations “the same immunity . . . as is enjoyed by foreign
1. See Russ Buettner, Bronx Judge Rejects Stauss-Kahn’s Claim of Diplomatic
Immunity in Sexual Assault Suit, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2012, at A23.
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See Diallo v. Strauss-Kahn, No. 307065/11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 1, 2012), available
at http://www.nycourts.gov/press/DSK-30706511.pdf.
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part I.C.3.
8. See infra Part I.D.
9. See infra Part I.B.3.
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governments.”10 However, a circuit split has developed concerning the
immunity referenced by the IOIA, and whether it adopts revisions to U.S.
law governing foreign sovereign immunity, most importantly the FSIA.11
Part I of this Note examines the legislative history and policy interests
behind both statutes. Part II analyzes the divergent approaches taken by the
D.C. and Third Circuits regarding the relevance of post-IOIA foreign state
immunity doctrine to the immunity of international organizations in U.S.
courts. Finally, Part II suggests that both circuits formed their conclusions
based on incomplete historical understandings of sovereign immunity at the
time the IOIA was passed. Clarifying that history gives the IOIA’s
reference to sovereign immunity a new meaning—one that conforms to a
plain reading of the statute as a whole and also follows the intent expressed
in the legislative history. This new reading, which advocates judicial
deference to immunity determinations by the executive branch, would allow
for the articulation of a clear standard of immunity for international
organizations.
I. SAME AS WHAT? A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Part I explores the development of foreign sovereign immunity and its
relation to the IOIA. Part I.A traces the advancement of absolute sovereign
immunity in U.S. courts up through the early twentieth century and then
highlights the abandonment of that doctrine in favor of judicial deference to
executive policy starting in the late 1930s. Part I.B describes the sudden
prominence of international organizations in the aftermath of World War II,
the United States’s leading role in forming and empowering these
organizations, and the interplay between the United States’s new global
prominence and the creation of the IOIA. Part I.C explains the State
Department’s decision to adopt the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign
immunity, the problems caused by State Department determination of
sovereign immunity, and Congress’s intention to relieve these issues by
passing the FSIA. Finally, Part I.D traces the initial post-FSIA treatments
of the IOIA and the development of the corresponding benefit test.
A. The Development of Sovereign Immunity in the United States,
1812 to 1945
In Atkinson v. Inter-American Development Bank,12 decided in 1998, the
D.C. Circuit found that Congress’s intention when it passed the IOIA was
to grant to international organizations the same immunity as foreign
sovereigns “as it existed in 1945—when immunity of foreign sovereigns

10. See International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b) (2006); infra
Part I.B.3.
11. See infra Part II.
12. 156 F.3d 1335, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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was absolute.”13 However, while sovereigns did enjoy absolute immunity
in the United States for a time, that time had arguably passed when the
IOIA was enacted in December 1945.14 The following discussion describes
the evolution of foreign sovereign immunity law in U.S. courts, starting
with the development of an absolute immunity standard from 1812 through
the early 1930s. It then examines the expansion of executive authority over
all matters of foreign policy in the late 1930s, and the corresponding shift
away from judicial determination and absolute foreign sovereign immunity.
1. Recognition of Foreign Sovereign Immunity by the U.S. Supreme Court:
From The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon to
Berizzi Bros. v. Steamship Pesaro
The immunity of a foreign state sued in the national courts of the United
State has “long and uncritically” been understood as a sub-constitutional
question and, therefore, fully subject to congressional determination and
discretion.15 However, for much of U.S. history, foreign sovereign
immunity was not regulated by congressional statute; rather, the U.S.
Supreme Court determined immunity questions.16 In other words, up to the
1930s, foreign sovereign immunity was decided as a matter of federal
common law, wherein the Court observed a strict absolute immunity
standard for foreign states.17 Consequently, if a defendant qualified as a
foreign sovereign in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, U.S.
courts consistently found that it had immunity for all of its acts, including
those that were commercial in nature.18
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon19 is generally regarded as the
landmark decision on sovereign immunity in the United States.20 The case
involved a French warship that had taken shelter in the port of Philadelphia
during a storm.21 The ship was alleged to be a converted U.S.
merchantman, and its purported American owners brought an in rem

13. See id. at 1341.
14. See Steven Herz, International Organizations in U.S. Courts: Reconsidering the
Anachronism of Absolute Immunity, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 471, 502 (2008).
15. See Thomas H. Lee, The World Balance of Power and the Evolution of U.S.
Foreign-States Law 33 (2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review). Professor Lee argues that this question is open to criticism from a historical
perspective, as evidence suggests that some framers believed that the Constitution required
consent for suits against foreign states. See id. at 33–34.
16. See id. at 32.
17. See id.
18. See CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 572 (2003) (describing how the foreign sovereign immunity recognized by
the Supreme Court in The Schooner Exchange was gradually extended to all government
property and eventually to any suit against a foreign nation).
19. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
20. See VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUS, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN
U.S. COURTS 526 (2003); see also Steven R. Swanson, Jurisdictional Discovery Under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 13 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 445, 448 (1999).
21. See The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 117; see also Lee, supra note 15, at 35.
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admiralty action to reclaim it.22 In deciding The Schooner Exchange, Chief
Justice Marshall found that a French ship of war was not subject to the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts due to the international convention of “perfect
equality and absolute independence of sovereigns.”23 However, Chief
Justice Marshall made clear that the court was following custom, not
binding law: foreign sovereign states were not categorically immune from
U.S. jurisdiction; rather, Congress could authorize courts to exercise
jurisdiction over any property within its territory.24 Instead, foreign
sovereign immunity was a matter of mutual expectation between sovereign
states that was necessary for nations to freely interact.25 According to Chief
Justice Marshall, sovereigns were bound “not to degrade the dignity of
[their] nation,” and consequently, would never expose their sovereign rights
to the jurisdiction of another by entering a foreign territory without an
assurance that “the immunities belonging to his independent sovereign
station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and
will be extended to him.”26
By its own terms, The Schooner Exchange applied only to the public
property of a foreign sovereign destined for public use.27 In fact, Chief
Justice Marshall considered the distinction between the public and private
actions of a foreign sovereign and suggested that only the former should be
accorded immunity.28 Over time, however, the public purpose of sovereign
property received an expansive interpretation, extending immunity first to
foreign ships that were not warships, then to foreign government property,

22. See The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 116–17; NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 20,
at 526; Lee, supra note 15, at 35.
23. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 137; see also Swanson supra note 20, at 448.
24. See The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 137, 146 (“Without doubt, the sovereign of
the place is capable of destroying this implication. He may claim and exercise jurisdiction
either by employing force, or by subjecting such vessels to the ordinary tribunals. But until
such power be exerted in a manner not to be misunderstood, the sovereign cannot be
considered as having imparted to the ordinary tribunals a jurisdiction, which it would be a
breach of faith to exercise.”); see also NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 20, at 527; Lee, supra
note 15, at 36. Chief Justice Marshall’s assertion is often cited as the basis for the
conclusion that foreign sovereign immunity in U.S. courts is fully subject to congressional
control. See Lee, supra note 15, at 36.
25. See NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 20, at 527.
26. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 137; see also NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 20,
at 527.
27. See Richard J. Oparil, Immunity of International Organizations in United States
Courts: Absolute or Restrictive? 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 689, 693 (1991).
28. See The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 145 (“[T]here is a manifest distinction
between the private property of the person who happens to be a prince, and that military
force which supports the sovereign power, and maintains the dignity and the independence
of a nation. A prince, by acquiring private property in a foreign country, may possibly be
considered as subjecting that property to the territorial jurisdiction; he may be considered as
so far laying down the prince, and assuming the character of a private individual; but this he
cannot be presumed to do with respect to any portion of that armed force, which upholds his
crown, and the nation he is entrusted to govern.”); see also NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note
20, at 527.
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and finally to any suit against a foreign nation.29 Eventually The Schooner
Exchange came to be regarded as granting absolute immunity to foreign
sovereigns in almost any endeavor.30
The extent of this expanded immunity was demonstrated in 1926 when
the U.S. Supreme Court heard Berizzi Bros. v. Steamship Pesaro.31 In
Pesaro, the Court considered whether sovereign immunity applied to the
commercial actions of a foreign government.32 The Court’s decision in
Pesaro included two key conclusions: First, the Court held that sovereign
immunity was absolute, finding that The Schooner Exchange’s rationale for
the immunity of foreign sovereigns applied equally to a state’s public acts
and commercial acts.33 Second, the Court made clear that the judiciary, not
the executive, would decide the scope of sovereign immunity.34 In the
district court, the State Department had recommended that customary
foreign sovereign immunity was not appropriate when foreign states
engaged in commercial activities;35 however, on appeal the Supreme Court
declined to address that recommendation, thereby implicitly suggesting that
the executive branch’s view ought not to influence the Court’s analysis in
any way.36 As a result, following Pesaro, foreign sovereigns could expect
to enjoy absolute immunity in the United States, as the Supreme Court
indicated that the scope of foreign sovereign immunity would be treated as
a judicial inquiry, and precedent dictated that this immunity was absolute.37
2. Judicial Deference to the Executive Branch: Ex parte Republic of Peru
and Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman
The Great Depression and the New Deal era saw momentous changes in
the relationship between the executive branch and the U.S. Supreme
Court.38 During this time, challenges to judicial formalism under the socalled “New Deal Court” gradually undermined the acceptance of the
deductive, common-law-based rulemaking that constituted the Court’s
approach in decisions like Pesaro.39 Instead, under the leadership of Chief
Justice Hughes, the Court increasingly applied a “realist” approach that was

29. See Oparil, supra note 27, at 693–94; BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 18,
at 572.
30. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (citing The
Schooner Exchange for the proposition that “[f]or more than a century and a half, the United
States generally granted foreign sovereigns complete immunity from suit in the courts of this
country”).
31. 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926).
32. See id.; see also Herz, supra note 14, at 503–04.
33. See Pesaro, 271 U.S. at 574; see also Herz, supra note 14, at 503–04.
34. Herz, supra note 14, at 504.
35. See The Pesaro, 277 F. 473, 479–80 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); see also Herz, supra note 14,
at 504.
36. See Pesaro, 271 U.S. at 574; Herz, supra note 14, at 504.
37. See Pesaro, 271 U.S. at 574; Herz, supra note 14, at 503–04.
38. See Herz, supra note 14, at 504–05.
39. See id. at 504.
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more politically conscious and deferential to the elected branches.40 In
particular, this approach was defined by a newfound respect for the
executive branch in matters of foreign policy.41 In a series of cases
throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the Court consolidated the authority of the
President to speak with “one voice” in foreign affairs.42
That authority included the ability to determine sovereign immunity.
Between 1938 and 1945, the Court gradually abandoned Pesaro’s position
that sovereign immunity was a judicial question in favor of a new approach
in which the foreign policy considerations of the State Department were
controlling.43 Under this new approach, the determinations of the executive
branch with regard to foreign sovereign immunity were binding on courts,
regardless of what international custom might say.44 This change in policy
had important implications because, in the aftermath of the worldwide
Great Depression, many governments were no longer hesitant to enter the
commercial arena.45 Consequently, the question of whether a sovereign,
acting in a purely commercial manner, should enjoy immunity took on
increasing importance.46
By the end of 1945, two cases made clear that it was State Department
policy, and not the courts, that determined sovereign immunity. Those
cases also made it clear that sovereign immunity was no longer absolute. In
Ex parte Republic of Peru,47 the U.S. Supreme Court specifically addressed
the executive branch’s role in immunity decisions and, in a complete
reversal of earlier opinions, concluded that the Court would follow the State
Department’s recommendation rather than risk embarrassment to U.S.
foreign relations.48
Ex parte Peru involved a claim against a vessel owned and operated by
Peru, 49 who had obtained a letter from the State Department declaring that
the United States “recognizes and allows the claim of immunity.”50 The
Court held that the State Department’s determination of immunity was
conclusive and that the ship was therefore immune from seizure: “[T]he
judicial seizure of the vessel of a friendly foreign state is so serious a
challenge to its dignity, and may so affect our friendly relations with it, that
courts are required to accept and follow the executive determination that the
vessel is immune.”51

40. See id.
41. See id. at 505; see also BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 18, at 573.
42. See Herz, supra note 14, at 505.
43. See id. at 504.
44. See BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 18, at 573; see also NANDA & PANSIUS,
supra note 20, at 529.
45. See Herz, supra note 14, at 505.
46. See id.
47. 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
48. See id. at 588; Oparil, supra note 27, at 694; Swanson, supra note 20, at 449.
49. See Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 580.
50. See id. at 581; see also NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 20, at 529.
51. Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 588; see also NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 20, at 529.
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In the second case, Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman,52 the U.S. Supreme
Court applied the same rule of absolute deference to the executive branch as
it did in Ex parte Peru, but this time it denied immunity.53 Hoffman
involved a claim for damages made against a merchant vessel owned by
Mexico, but operated by a private company.54 In response to Mexico’s
request for a statement of immunity, the State Department recognized
Mexico’s ownership of the vessel, but did not recommend that immunity be
granted.55 Instead, the State Department instructed the Court to refer to
earlier statements and decisions relating to similar issues.56 Accordingly, in
light of prior determinations and in the absence of a new immunity
recommendation by the executive branch, the Supreme Court held that it
would be inappropriate to grant immunity to the vessel: “[I]t is therefore
not for the courts to deny an immunity which our government has seen fit to
allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which the government has
not seen fit to recognize.”57
As a result of Ex parte Peru and Hoffman, by early 1945 U.S. foreign
sovereign immunity law had clearly departed from an absolute immunity
standard.58 Instead, courts deferred to the State Department’s foreign
sovereign immunity determinations when deciding whether immunity was
appropriate in a particular suit.59 If no specific recommendation was made,
courts restricted themselves to the level of immunity recommended by
previous State Department determinations.60
B. The Rise of International Organizations and the Creation of the
International Organizations Immunities Act
The end of World War II witnessed a renewed, and more practical,
emphasis on the importance of international governmental organizations—
organizations consisting primarily or entirely of sovereign member states
and that operate across national borders.61 This focus coincided with the
52. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
53. See Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 35; NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 20, at 529–30.
54. See Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 31.
55. See id. at 36–37.
56. See id.; see also Swanson supra note 20, at 449–50.
57. See Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 35; see also NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 20, at 529–30.
58. See Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 35–36 (“It is therefore not for the courts to deny an
immunity which our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new
grounds which the government has not seen fit to recognize. . . . [R]ecognition by the courts
of an immunity upon principles which the political department of government has not
sanctioned may be equally embarrassing to it in securing the protection of our national
interests and their recognition by other nations.”); Herz, supra note 14, at 510.
59. See NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 20, at 529; see also Herz, supra note 14, at 508–
10.
60. See Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 36–38; see also NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 20, at 530.
61. See Herz, supra note 14, at 488; see, e.g., International Organizations Immunities
Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288 (2006) (defining an international organization as “a public international
organization in which the United States participates pursuant to any treaty or under the
authority of any Act of Congress authorizing such participation or making an appropriation
for such participation, and which shall have been designated by the President through
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rise of the United States as a global power.62 The result was an
understanding that the United States would play an essential role in these
new organizations.63 The following sections discuss this dynamic and
explain how it led to the adoption of the IOIA.
1. The Growth of International Organizations in the Aftermath of
World War II
As World War II drew to a close, the Allied Powers recognized a need
for international cooperation to rebuild the devastated global economy and
guard against another outbreak of violence.64 While the League of Nations
had failed to prevent the war, that failure had not produced a sense of
futility about the effectiveness of international organizations.65 Rather, the
lesson drawn was that international organizations had to be given teeth, as
the problem with earlier organizations was that they were too idealistic and
lacked institutional heft.66 The Allies’ response was to create a multitude of
international organizations whose purposes would be to deter aggression,
facilitate the resolution of conflicts, provide financing for reconstruction,
and stabilize global currencies and trade.67 Some of these organizations,
like the United Nations (U.N.), the IMF, the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and the Organization of
American States (OAS) have become household names, while others have
But well known or not, these
received scant media attention.68
organizations have come to assume “massive importance” in international
politics and the global economy.69
A key factor in the post-World War II redevelopment of international
organizations was the widespread acceptance of the “functional necessity”
test in international theory and practice.70 Under this test, international
organizations possess the immunities that are “necessary for the fulfillment
of [their] purposes” and for their independence from member states.71
Independence is generally understood as “the authority to act with a degree
of autonomy, and often with neutrality, in defined spheres.”72 The
functional necessity test was viewed as a means of recognizing the interests
appropriate Executive order as being entitled to enjoy the privileges, exemptions, and
immunities provided in this subchapter”).
62. See Herz, supra note 14, at 488; see also INIS L. CLAUDE, JR., SWORDS INTO
PLOWSHARES 61 (4th ed. 1984).
63. See CLAUDE, supra note 62, at 61.
64. See Herz, supra note 14, at 488.
65. See CLAUDE, supra note 62, at 57.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 57–58.
68. See Oparil, supra note 27, at 689.
69. See id.
70. See Note, Jurisdictional Immunities of Intergovernmental Organizations, 91 YALE
L.J. 1167, 1181 (1982) [hereinafter Jurisdictional Immunities].
71. See id. (internal citations omitted).
72. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal International
Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 9 (1998).
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of member states—particularly the more powerful ones that were unlikely
to join an organization they could not influence—without leaving an
organization so exposed that it would be unable to achieve the ends for
which it was formed.73
Initially, concern for the independence of these new organizations that
were established in the 1940s and 1950s led to a consensus that
international organizations required complete jurisdictional immunity.74
However, while the strength and durability of these organizations has since
been proven over time, the basic purpose for granting immunity to
international organizations remains the same: “to secure for them both
legal and practical independence, so that these international organizations
should be able to fulfill their task.”75 This goal is reflected in the U.N.
Charter, adopted in June 1945, which provides: “The Organization shall
enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be
necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its
purposes.”76 Similar provisions are included in the charters or basic
instruments of most other international organizations.77
2. U.S. Supremacy After World War II and Its Leadership in the
Formation of International Organizations
Among the nations working to form a new system of international
organizations in the aftermath of World War II, the United States was
generally regarded as the indispensible participant.78 The primacy of the
United States in this undertaking was due to at least two factors: The first
was the nation’s “unequaled” military and economic power.79 The second
was the global prestige of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, whose efforts to
build a lasting peace brought him recognition as “the spiritual father of the
United Nations.”80 Because of the United States’s prominence, it was
considered a “practical certainty” that many of these organizations would be
located, or at least conduct substantial activity, within its borders.81
73. See id. at 16.
74. See Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 70, at 1181.
75. JOSEF L. KUNZ, Privileges and Immunities International Organizations, in THE
CHANGING LAW OF NATIONS: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 509, 522–23 (1968).
76. U.N. Charter art. 104; see THOMAS M. FRANCK & MICHAEL J. GLENNON, FOREIGN
RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND SIMULATIONS 506 (2d
ed. 1987). Unlike foreign sovereign immunity, which could extend to any activity that a
foreign nation chooses to engage in, the functional immunity of international organizations
only applies to those limited activities that the organization was formed to perform. See id.
77. See, e.g., Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. 8,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154; Articles of Agreement of the International Development
Association art. 8, Sept. 24, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 2284, 439 U.N.T.S. 249; see also, FRANCK &
GLENNON, supra note 76, at 506.
78. See Herz, supra note 14, at 488; see also CLAUDE, supra note 62, at 61.
79. See CLAUDE, supra note 62, at 61.
80. See id.
81. See Herz, supra note 14, at 488. For example, in 1945 Congress invited the U.N. to
establish its permanent base in the United States, and soon thereafter the organization settled
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However, locating international organizations within the United States
left them more vulnerable to actions and pressures by the U.S. government
than by other nations.82 As a result, in order to host these organizations the
United States had to assure the international community that suitable
conditions were in place to protect their legal and practical independence.83
3. The Creation and Enactment of the International
Organizations Immunities Act
The IOIA was enacted in 1945 to provide international organizations
with the necessary immunity under U.S. law to enable them to fulfill their
proper functions when operating in the United States.84 The key provision
of the IOIA, section 2, specifies:
International organizations, their property and their assets, wherever
located, and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy the same immunity from
suit and every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign
governments, except to the extent that such organizations may expressly
waive their immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms
of any contract.85

Before the IOIA was enacted, U.S. law made no provision for the
immunity of either international organizations or their personnel.86
However, the United States did generally recognize international
organizations as having legal capacity, and as a result, those organizations
were left vulnerable to suits on the same basis as private parties.87
The driving force behind the IOIA was a report submitted by the
Secretary of State to the President after the San Francisco Conference on
the U.N. Charter.88 The report concluded that Article 105 of the U.N.
Charter required the United States to enact appropriate immunity legislation
to ensure the organization’s independence.89 Due to the high probability
that the U.N. would locate within the United States, or at the very least,
carry out substantial activities there, it became “essential to adopt this . . .
into its current headquarters in New York City. See BOB REINALDA, ROUTLEDGE HISTORY OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 286 (2009).
82. See Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 70, at 1185.
83. See id.
84. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-1203, at 2 (1945); S. REP. NO. 79-861, at 2 (1945).
85. International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b) (2006).
86. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-1203, at 2; S. REP. NO. 79-861, at 2; see also Jurisdictional
Immunities, supra note 70, at 1168.
87. See Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 70, at 1168.
88. See Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 70, at 1169.
89. See id.; see also U.N. Charter art. 105, para. 1–3 (“1. The Organization shall enjoy in
the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the
fulfillment of its purposes. 2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and
officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are
necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the
Organization. 3. The General Assembly may make recommendations with a view to
determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article or may
propose conventions to the Members of the United Nations for this purpose.”).
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legislation promptly.”90 Of particular concern was ensuring that the
extension of suitable privileges and immunities to international
organizations like the U.N. did not “embarrass” the United States in its
foreign relations.91 Consequently, the State Department drafted and
sponsored a bill granting judicial immunity to international organizations
and presented it to Congress for further action.92
According to congressional reports discussing the bill, the basic purpose
of the IOIA was to “confer upon international organizations . . . privileges
and immunities of a governmental nature.”93 Those privileges were to be
“similar to those granted by the United States to foreign governments and
their officials,”94 but not identical, as the reasons behind granting immunity
to international organizations differed from those for recognizing sovereign
While sovereign immunity reflected the concerns of
immunity.95
international custom and national dignity,96 the immunity of international
organizations reflected America’s foreign policy decision to surrender some
of its sovereign jurisdiction in exchange for membership in the growing
body of international organizations.97 The congressional reports provide a
justification for why the United States would willingly surrender
jurisdiction, explaining that the IOIA reflected the “self-interest” of the
United States by not only protecting the official actions of international
organizations in the United States, but also “strengthen[ing] the position” of
other organizations of which the United States was a member, but which
were located or acting in other countries.98
Furthermore, in considering the IOIA, Congress relied on an assertion
from the State Department that the immunity granted to international
organizations and their officials would be “somewhat more limited than
those which are extended by the United States to foreign governments.”99
For example, the immunity of officers and officials of international
organizations would be limited to acts performed in their official capacity,
whereas the diplomatic officers of foreign nations enjoyed full immunity
from legal process.100
Moreover, the immunities provided for by the IOIA could easily be
limited by Presidential action.101 In recommending the bill’s passage, the
House Committee on Ways and Means found that the “interests of the

90. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-1203, at 2.
91. See id.
92. See Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 70, at 1169.
93. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-1203, at 1; S. REP. NO. 79-861, at 1 (1945).
94. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1203, at 6; see also S. REP. NO. 79-861, at 1.
95. See Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 70, at 1168.
96. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text.
97. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-1203, at 2; S. REP. NO. 79-861, at 2; see also Jurisdictional
Immunities, supra note 70, at 1168.
98. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-1203, at 2; S. REP. NO. 79-861, at 2.
99. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-1203, at 6; S. REP. NO. 79-861, at 3.
100. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-1203, at 6.
101. See International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288 (2006).
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United States are adequately protected . . . [by] the broad powers granted to
the President.”102 Section 1 of the IOIA provides that:
The President [is] authorized, in the light of the functions performed by
any such international organization, by appropriate Executive order to
withhold or withdraw from any such organization or its officers or
employees any of the privileges, exemptions, and immunities provided for
in this subchapter . . . or to condition or limit the enjoyment by any such
organization or its officers or employees of any such privilege,
exemption, or immunity.103

According to congressional reports, those powers allowed the President to
rectify any abuse of the immunities granted by the IOIA and, most
importantly, permitted the President to limit an organization’s immunity in
“the event that any international organization should engage . . . in activities
of a commercial nature.”104
C. Getting to FSIA: The Restrictive Theory of
Sovereign Immunity in the United States
The twentieth century witnessed a shift in international custom away
from absolute sovereign immunity and towards a new theory of restrictive
immunity.105 This theory was first introduced into U.S. law by the State
Department,106 but was eventually codified in the FSIA.107 The following
discussion covers the State Department’s adoption of restrictive immunity
in the Tate Letter. It then analyzes the political and procedural problems
created by the State Department’s determination of foreign sovereign
immunity and illustrates how those unique problems motivated Congress to
pass the FSIA.
1. Changing International Custom and the Tate Letter
In the wake of the Great Depression, many sovereign states were no
longer reluctant to enter the commercial arena.108 As a result, throughout
the twentieth century, sovereign nations assumed increasingly prominent
roles in activities that had historically been the purview of private actors.109
For example, state-sponsored trading companies and manufacturing
interests became commonplace.110 However, this trend created a serious
problem: when states engaged in commercial transactions with private
parties, the customary recognition of absolute immunity allowed foreign
102. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-1203, at 3.
103. 22 U.S.C. § 288.
104. See S. REP. NO. 79-861, at 2; see also H.R. REP. NO. 79-1203, at 6.
105. See Swanson, supra note 20, at 450–51.
106. See Oparil, supra note 27, at 694.
107. See Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006); H.R. REP.
NO. 94-1487, at 45 (1976).
108. See Herz, supra note 14, at 505.
109. See Swanson, supra note 20, at 450.
110. See id. at 450–51.
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sovereigns to breach contractual obligations with impunity.111
Consequently, a corresponding movement naturally developed within
international custom whereby foreign sovereign immunity was restricted to
exclude certain activities.112 The purpose of this shift was to protect private
parties from injury due to the acts of a foreign sovereign operating as a
business, while preserving the sovereign’s privilege to act with immunity in
an official manner.113 Under this new approach—termed the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity—a state retained immunity for its public acts
but surrendered immunity when acting as a private party.114 Nearly all
states adopted the restrictive theory of immunity by the latter half of the
twentieth century.115
As the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity gained prominence
abroad, the State Department attempted to clarify the standard for sovereign
immunity under U.S. law by publishing the Tate Letter in 1952.116 The
Tate Letter is a memo that was written to the U.S. Attorney General by the
Acting Legal Advisor for the State Department, Jack Tate.117 It indicated
that the State Department would no longer recognize immunity for the
private acts of foreign sovereigns and explained the key reasons for
adopting this position.118 Those reasons included that a substantial number
of states had already adopted the restrictive theory, that the United States no
longer asserted immunity in foreign courts over its commercial activities
abroad, and that U.S. citizens dealing with the increased number of states
involved in commercial transactions deserved access to the courts.119

111. See Stena Rederi AB v. Comision de Contratos del Comite Ejecutivo General del
Sindicato Revolucionario de Trabajadores Petroleros de la Republica Mexicana, S.C., 923
F.2d 380, 384 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that the restrictive theory of immunity developed in
response to the “harsh and inequitable results” caused by the vision of absolute foreign
sovereign immunity endorsed by The Schooner Exchange).
112. See Swanson, supra note 20, at 451.
113. See NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 20, at 525.
114. See id.; see also FRANCK & GLENNON, supra note 76, at 226.
115. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 451 (1987) [hereinafter U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW]; FRANCK & GLENNON, supra note
76, at 226. For example, a 1952 study by the State Department determined that the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity originated in Belgium and Italy and had since
become the prevailing theory under international custom. Other countries that had rejected
absolute immunity and accepted the new theory of restrictive immunity by 1952 included
Switzerland, France, Austria, and Greece. See William W. Bishop, Jr., New United States
Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity, 47 AM. J. INT’L L. 93, 93–94 (1953).
116. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor to the Dep’t of State, to Philip B.
Perlman, Acting Att’y Gen. (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 969, 984 (1952)
[hereinafter Tate Letter]; see also Oparil, supra note 27, at 694. While Ex parte Peru and
Hoffman signaled that the United States no longer recognized absolute sovereign immunity,
the extent of the new limitations was unclear. The denial of immunity in Hoffman only
implied that a state could be subject to U.S. jurisdiction absent a suggestion by the State
Department that immunity was appropriate, whereas under the restrictive theory a state was
liable when it chose to act as a private party. See supra notes 52–60 and accompanying text.
117. See Swanson, supra note 20, at 451.
118. See id.; Oparil, supra note 27, at 694.
119. See Tate Letter, supra note 116, at 984–85; see also Swanson supra note 20, at 451.
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2. Politics in the Courts: The State Department, Foreign Governments,
and Private Citizens
In principle, the Tate Letter meant that the restrictive theory was now the
standard for determining sovereign immunity under U.S. law.120 The
reality, however, was not as straightforward. The courts continued to show
deference to specific State Department determinations when they were
made, but when the State Department was silent, courts interpreted the Tate
Letter as the current expression of U.S. foreign policy and, within those
parameters, applied their own understanding of restrictive immunity.121
Consequently, two branches of government made sovereign immunity
determinations based on a variety of factors with uneven results.122 The
outcome was an inconsistent standard whereby courts would honor the
State Department’s suggestion of immunity even when their own
understanding of the Tate Letter would have led them to deny it.123
Complicating this system was the inescapable reality that the executive
branch and the State Department were political institutions responsive to
the pressures and requirements of foreign relations.124 Foreign states were
well aware that the responsibility for deciding questions of immunity rested
primarily with the State Department, and that courts would grant immunity
when it was recommended by the executive branch.125 Therefore,
sovereign nations often placed diplomatic pressure on the State Department
to encourage a recommendation of immunity regardless of whether
immunity would be available under the restrictive theory.126 As a result,
the State Department found itself having to factor diplomacy into its
immunity considerations, on top of legal judgments about the customary
international law of immunity.127 Understandably, the decisions made in
many of these cases reflected politics more than the merits of the case, with
inconsistent results for the private citizens bringing the claims.128

120. See Swanson, supra note 20, at 451.
121. See id. at 451–52.
122. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983).
123. See Swanson, supra note 20, at 451–52.
124. See Stena Rederi AB v. Comision de Contratos del Comite Ejecutivo General del
Sindicato Revolucionario de Trabajadores Petroleros de la Republica Mexicana, S.C., 923
F.2d 380, 385 (5th Cir. 1991) (remarking that State Department determinations after the Tate
Letter were complicated by diplomatic pressure exerted by foreign states).
125. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487–88; see also Herz, supra note 14, at 490–91.
126. See Herz, supra note 14, at 490–91.
127. See id.
128. See Swanson supra note 20, at 452; see, e.g., Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President
of India, 446 F.2d 1198, 1201 (2d Cir. 1971) (dismissing a private claim against India based
upon a formal suggestion of immunity by the State Department and noting that once the
State Department has issued its ruling, the judiciary will follow that recommendation
regardless of whether the court’s independent analysis might suggest a contrary result).
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3. A Single, Fair Standard: FSIA, Judicial Determination, and the
Removal of Diplomatic Pressure
Congress passed the FSIA in 1976 in order to establish a reliable and
definitive statutory baseline for when a foreign state could be subject to
U.S. jurisdiction.129 The Act defines a foreign state as “not only the foreign
state but also political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities of the
foreign state.”130 Today, the FSIA is the standard for determining foreign
sovereign immunity under U.S. law.131
Technically, the FSIA was a reaffirmation of the principles first
expressed in the Tate Letter, as its explicit purpose was to codify the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.132 Under the FSIA’s terms,
foreign states are generally immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts,
unless one of the Act’s exceptions applies.133 In discussing international
organizations and the IOIA, the two most important exceptions have been
waiver by foreign states and actions involving commercial activities.134
Under the FSIA, a foreign state surrenders its immunity from the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts when it “has waived its immunity either
explicitly or by implication,” or the “action is based upon a commercial
activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state” or is otherwise
connected to the United States.135
An express waiver is generally understood to be a “clear and
unambiguous intent to waive immunity,” so that the determination to
By comparison, Congress
surrender immunity is unmistakable.136
suggested that an implicit waiver would exist under the FSIA where a
foreign state enters into a contract and agrees that the laws of another state
should govern the agreement, or when a foreign state files a responsive
pleading in an action without raising immunity as a defense.137
Regarding the commercial activities exception, the FSIA provides that
any determination should be based on the nature—not the purpose—of the
129.
130.
131.
132.

See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 6–7 (1976); NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 20, at 525.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 15.
See id. at 6; Swanson supra note 20, at 445.
See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983); see also
FRANCK & GLENNON, supra note 76, at 224.
133. See Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006); see also
Swanson, supra note 20, at 445.
134. See, e.g., OSS Nokalva, Inc. v. European Space Agency, 617 F.3d 756 (3d Cir.
2010) (determining that the FSIA does apply to the IOIA and that international organizations
can be held liable for their commercial activities); Atkinson v. Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, 156
F.3d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that international organizations are entitled to absolute
immunity under the IOIA and can only surrender immunity by waiver); Mendaro v. World
Bank, 717 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (finding that a constructive waiver of immunity may
exist when the waiver would provide a corresponding benefit to the organization); Broadbent
v. Org. of Am. States, 628 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (discussing whether the wrongful
termination of employees qualified as a commercial activity under the FSIA).
135. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605.
136. See NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 20, at 677.
137. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 18 (1976).
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conduct.138 Courts have established that a state engages in commercial
activity when it enters into the transactions that are generally open to
private parties, as opposed to performing the public acts of a government
that can only be done by a sovereign state.139 In developing the commercial
exception, Congress suggested that “a foreign government’s sale of a
service or a product, its leasing of property, its borrowing of money, its
employment or engagement of laborers, clerical staff or public relations or
marketing agents, or its investment in a security of an American
corporation,” would all be considered commercial activities.140
While the FSIA can formally be viewed as a codification of the
principles first expressed in the Tate Letter, the Act was also a direct
attempt to remedy the problems of the former doctrine.141 The legislative
history specifies that the FSIA would accomplish four goals: First, it would
codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.142 Second, it would
remove the executive branch from sovereign immunity decisions and
instead allow the judiciary to fairly evaluate claims without the pressures of
foreign relations.143 Third, it would specify procedures for establishing
jurisdiction over a foreign state.144 Fourth, it would create a mechanism for
executing any judgment obtained against a foreign state.145
Of these four goals, the legislative history suggests that removing foreign
sovereign immunity determinations from the State Department’s control
was the most important.146 Congress was concerned about the impact of
foreign policy and diplomatic pressure on the State Department’s immunity
determinations.147 By transforming those determinations into cases of
statutory interpretation by the judiciary, Congress hoped that the FSIA
would free the State Department from diplomatic pressure to recognize the
immunity of foreign governments,148 and thereby assure litigants that
immunity decisions involving foreign states would be made on purely legal
grounds.149
The only direct reference to international organizations in the FSIA can
be found in 28 U.S.C. § 1611(a), which precludes attachment and execution
against the funds and other property of certain international
138. See Swanson, supra note 20, at 455.
139. See id. at 457.
140. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 16.
141. See id. at 7.
142. See id. at 7–8; see also Swanson, supra note 20, at 453.
143. See id. at 7–8; see also Swanson, supra note 20, at 453.
144. See id. at 7–8; see also Swanson, supra note 20, at 453.
145. See id. at 7–8; see also Swanson, supra note 20, at 453.
146. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7; see also Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria,
461 U.S. 480, 487–88 (1983); Stena Rederi v. Comision de Contratos del Comite Ejecutivo
General del Sindicato Revolucionario de Trabajadores Petroleros de la Republica Mexicana,
S.C., 923 F.2d 380, 385 (5th Cir. 1991); Herz, supra note 14, at 492.
147. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7.
148. See id.; see also Jared Sher, Case Comment, Immunity Under the IOIA: An
“Absolute”-ly Airtight Defense, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 769, 773 (2000).
149. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7.
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organizations.150 According to the legislative history, this reference was
“not intended to restrict any immunity accorded to such international
organizations under any other law or international agreement.”151 Instead,
the purpose of the subsection was to protect international organizations
designated by the President as deserving protection under the IOIA from
“hindrance by private claimants seeking to attach the payment of funds to a
foreign state.”152
D. The FSIA and the IOIA: Uncertainty in the Law
The enactment of the FSIA sparked a debate over the level of immunity
provided to international organizations under the IOIA.153 On the one
hand, nothing in the language or legislative history of the FSIA suggests
that it was intended to apply to the IOIA.154 However, some courts and
scholars have highlighted the IOIA’s reference to “the same immunity . . .
as is enjoyed by foreign governments,”155 and pointed to a canon of
statutory construction, which provides that a statute referring generally to
an area of law adopts that law as it exists, including any subsequent
amendment or modification.156 This section begins with a summary of
scholarly opinion on the impact of the FSIA on the IOIA. It then discusses
a proposed amendment to the IOIA that would have directly incorporated
the FSIA’s restrictive immunity standard. Next, this section identifies
subsequent State Department recommendations for the immunity of
international organizations. Finally, it discusses the initial post-FSIA IOIA
decisions by the D.C. Circuit, which led to the development of the
corresponding benefit test.
1. Scholars Debate the IOIA After the FSIA
The FSIA makes only one reference to the IOIA, and that reference is
silent on the standard of immunity the IOIA provides.157 Notwithstanding
this silence, however, the IOIA’s general reference to sovereign immunity
has led scholars to debate the FSIA’s impact on the immunity of
international organizations.158 Some scholars have argued that when the
79th Congress referenced “the same immunity . . . as is enjoyed by foreign

150. See Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006); H.R. REP.
NO. 94-1487, at 30–31.
151. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 31.
152. See id. at 30.
153. See Herz, supra note 14, at 497; Oparil, supra note 27, at 706; Sher, supra note 148,
at 773.
154. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 29–30; see also Oparil, supra note 27, at 706; supra
notes 150–52 and accompanying text.
155. See International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288a (2006).
156. See OSS Nokalva, Inc. v. European Space Agency, 617 F.3d 756, 763–64 (3d Cir.
2010); Herz, supra note 14, at 497.
157. See supra notes 150–52 and accompanying text.
158. See 22 U.S.C. § 288.
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governments,”159 it intended to adopt subsequent developments in
sovereign immunity doctrine.160 This conclusion is often based on a wellestablished canon of statutory construction that a “statute which refers to
the law of a subject generally adopts the law on the subject as of the time
the law was invoked . . . includ[ing] all the amendments and modifications
of the law subsequent to the time the reference statute was enacted.”161
Therefore, according to this interpretation, the IOIA should adopt the FSIA
as a modification of sovereign immunity.162
By contrast, other scholars point to the plain language of the FSIA and its
legislative history to argue that the FSIA was enacted to address concerns
unrelated to the immunity of international organizations.163 These scholars
focus on two points: First, the FSIA expressly lists the entities and
activities that it meant to affect.164 And second, Congress’s concerns about
the impact of diplomatic and foreign policy pressure on the State
Department’s immunity determinations do not apply equally to
international organizations.165
Regarding the first point, these scholars argue that the FSIA applies, on
its face, only to “foreign states” or to “agenc[ies] or instrumentalit[ies] of a
foreign state.”166 The FSIA includes specific definitions for these entities,
and these definitions do not include international organizations.167
Therefore, a plain reading of the FSIA demonstrates the express intent to
alter sovereign immunity, while the FSIA’s silence on international
organizations indicates that Congress did not intend to disturb the IOIA.168
This conclusion is supported by the FSIA’s primary purpose, which was to
adopt the restrictive theory of immunity and thereby address the increased
commercial activities of foreign governments.169
Turning to their second point, these scholars assert that the FSIA was
passed in order to establish a default rule for sovereign immunity that
would apply equally to all foreign countries and remove the effect of
political calculations by the State Department.170 However, because the
United States is a member, if not the leading member, of every organization
covered by the IOIA, the impact of politics in determining the
159. See id. at § 288(a).
160. See, e.g., Herz, supra note 14, at 497.
161. Broadbent v. Org. of Am. States, 628 F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.08 (Sands ed., 4th ed. 1975); see also OSS
Nokalva, 617 F.3d at 763; Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim, 932 F. Supp. 19, 24 (D.D.C. 1996);
Herz, supra note 14, at 497.
162. See Herz, supra note 14, at 532.
163. See, e.g., Oparil, supra note 27, at 706; Sher, supra note 148, at 770.
164. See, e.g., Oparil, supra note 27, at 706–07.
165. See, e.g., Sher, supra note 148, at 770–73.
166. See, e.g., Oparil, supra note 27, at 706.
167. See Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1603 (2006); see
also Oparil, supra note 27, at 706.
168. See, e.g., Oparil, supra note 27, at 706.
169. See supra notes 141–49 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., Sher, supra note 148, at 773.
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organization’s immunity is very different than the pressures created by the
lobbying of foreign governments.171 Therefore, these scholars assert that
Congress entrusted the task of monitoring the immunity of international
organizations to the President, rather than transferring those determinations
to the judiciary.172
However, despite disagreement over the FSIA’s impact on the IOIA,
there is a growing acknowledgement that the immunity of international
organizations should be subject to some limitations.173 Specifically, there
appears to be a consensus among scholars that international organizations
should adhere to the general principles and customs of international law,
which increasingly include the theory of restrictive immunity.174
2. Working Toward a Solution: A Legislative Proposal to Amend the IOIA
In 1990, a bill was proposed that would have expressly amended the
IOIA so that international organizations would be entitled to immunity
under the FSIA.175 Senator Roth of Delaware introduced the bill, which
specified that, “[f]or purposes of [the IOIA], the phrase ‘same immunity
from suit and every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign
governments’ means the same immunity to which foreign states are entitled
under [the FSIA].”176 The bill also would have amended the FSIA so that it
would clearly apply to recognized international organizations.177 In
introducing the bill, Senator Roth stated, “I believe that restrictive
immunity as defined [in the FSIA] is in the best interest of domestic
corporations . . . . For this reason I am introducing a bill to amend the
[IOIA] to restrict the jurisdictional immunity to which certain international
organizations are entitled.”178 The bill never passed and was not proposed
again.179
3. The State Department Weighs In
In 1980, four years after the FSIA was passed, the General Counsel of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Leroy D. Clark, requested an
opinion from the State Department regarding U.S. jurisdiction over an

171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See, e.g., Herz, supra note 14, at 472; Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 70,
at 1181–83.
174. See, e.g., Herz, supra note 14, at 472; Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 70,
at 1183.
175. See Oparil, supra note 27, at 707.
176. S. RES. 2715, 101st Cong. (1990); Oparil, supra note 27, at 707.
177. See Oparil, supra note 27, at 707.
178. 136 Cong. Rec. 13409 (1990); see also Oparil, supra note 27, at 708.
179. See Oparil, supra note 27, at 708. The bill was introduced to the Senate Judiciary
Committee, but was not reported by the Committee in 1990 and was not subsequently reintroduced. See id.
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employee discrimination proceeding involving the World Bank.180 In
response, Robert Owen, the Legal Advisor of the State Department, issued
a statement recommending that the same restrictive immunity conferred on
foreign governments in the FSIA should be applied to international
organizations.181 His letter acknowledged the widespread adoption of the
restrictive theory of immunity under international law, as codified in the
United States by the FSIA, by virtue of which “international organizations
are now subject to the jurisdiction of our courts in respect of their
commercial activities, while retaining immunity for their acts of a public
character.”182 The State Department has issued similar statements in
response to all subsequent requests.183
4. The D.C. Circuit and the Development of the
Corresponding Benefit Test
The D.C. Circuit has played a central role in the development of the
IOIA.184 Due to its location, the D.C. Circuit has jurisdiction over all suits
filed against international organizations that are headquartered in
Washington, D.C.185 As a result, it has heard almost all of the cases
involving IOIA immunity claims.186
Though the FSIA was passed in 1976, its impact on the immunity of
international organizations was not addressed by a federal appellate court
until 1980, when the D.C. Circuit decided Broadbent v. Organization of
American States.187 However, the court sidestepped the question of which
immunity standard should apply by concluding that the OAS was immune
from the suit under either standard.188
The claim in Broadbent was brought by former employees of the OAS,
who were dismissed as part of a general downsizing effort by the
organization.189 The employees argued that the “same immunity” language
of the IOIA tied the immunity of international organizations to that of
foreign sovereigns, including all subsequent amendments and
modifications.190 In contrast, the OAS asserted that the IOIA granted
absolute immunity, and that Congress did not modify that grant when it

180. Marian L. Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 74 AM. J. INT’L L. 917 (1980).
181. See Letter from Robert Owen, Legal Advisor to the Dep’t of State, to Leroy D.
Clark, Gen. Counsel to the Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n (June 24, 1980), in Nash,
supra note 180, at 917–18 [hereinafter Owen Letter].
182. See id. at 918.
183. See, e.g., OSS Nokalva, Inc. v. European Space Agency, 617 F.3d 756, 763–64 (3d
Cir. 2010).
184. Herz, supra note 14, at 492.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. 628 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Herz, supra note 14, at 493.
188. See Herz, supra note 14, at 494.
189. See Broadbent, 628 F.2d at 28.
190. See id. at 31.
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passed the FSIA.191 The court agreed with the OAS and highlighted several
arguments in support of this position: First, the FSIA generally fails to
mention international organizations.192 Second, the text of the IOIA clearly
provides for modification of an organization’s immunity by the President,
who is empowered to withdraw or restrict the privileges granted by the
statute.193 And third, the legislative history suggests that the policies and
considerations that led Congress to pass the FSIA do not apply to
international organizations like the OAS.194
However, the court found that it did not have to resolve the impact of the
FSIA on the IOIA; rather, it reasoned that under either theory of
immunity—absolute or restrictive—the OAS was insulated from the
employees’ suit.195 In the court’s view, employment of internal clerical
personnel by either a foreign sovereign or international organization was
not a commercial activity, and therefore, the FSIA exception did not
apply.196 Instead, the court turned to the waiver prong of the IOIA and
found that the OAS had clearly intended claims by employees to be
resolved through its Administrative Tribunal.197 Therefore, the OAS had
therefore not waived its immunity, and the case was dismissed without a
ruling on the FSIA’s impact on the IOIA.198

191. See id.
192. See id. Only one section, § 1611, makes any explicit reference to international
organizations. It discusses the attachment of an organization’s property—which could
equally be the result of restrictive immunity under FSIA or a waiver by the organization
itself. See id.; see also Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1611 (2006).
193. See Broadbent, 628 F.2d at 32. The statute states:
The President [is] authorized, in the light of the functions performed by any such
international organization, by appropriate Executive order to withhold or withdraw
from any such organization or its officers or employees any of the privileges,
exemptions, and immunities provided for in this subchapter . . . or to condition or
limit the enjoyment by any such organization or its officers or employees of any
such privilege, exemption, or immunity.
International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288 (2006).
194. See Broadbent, 628 F.2d at 32. Historically, the court noted, the absolute immunity
granted to foreign sovereigns was justified by a need to avoid adjudication that might insult a
foreign nation and consequently embarrass the executive branch’s management of foreign
relations. See id. at 32 n.20. However, as nations became involved in the marketplace, they
distinguished claims arising from commercial transactions from those concerning traditional
areas of activity, and restrictive immunity was widely accepted as the standard for liability.
See id. But, the court emphasized, these rationales did not seem to justify the application of
restrictive immunity to international organizations, as the commercial activities of those
organizations remained limited to those necessary for the organizations’ chartered functions,
and other nations did not generally apply the concept of restrictive immunity to them. See id.
at 33.
195. See id. at 32–33.
196. See id. at 35.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 35–36. The court determined that the OAS Tribunal was competent to
determine the lawfulness of an employee’s termination and to provide adequate relief.
Because the OAS clearly intended to handle all employee suits internally, there was no
question that they had not expressly waived that right. See id.
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The D.C. Circuit was faced with a similar situation three years later,
when it heard Mendaro v. World Bank.199 In Mendaro, a former employee
brought a suit against the World Bank, which claimed immunity.200 In its
decision, the D.C. Circuit avoided the FSIA altogether. Building on
Broadbent, the court found that it was a well-established principle of
international law that an international organization is entitled to “such
privileges and such immunity from the jurisdiction of a member state as are
necessary for the fulfillment of the purposes of the organization.”201 The
court further determined that the immunity of international organizations
from suits by employees arising from the employee relationship, was “[o]ne
of the most important protections granted to international organizations.”202
This immunity served an essential and additional purpose beyond functional
necessity—to protect international organizations from control by one
member state over the internal activities of the organization.203 Therefore,
the court found that the World Bank was immune from employment suits
regardless of the FSIA’s impact on the IOIA, and turned instead to whether
that immunity had been waived.204
The court interpreted the IOIA’s requirement of an express waiver to
imply that courts should be “reluctant” to find that an organization had
waived immunity.205 The court acknowledged that the World Bank had not
expressly waived its immunity to “this particular suit.”206 The court next
reasoned that because the purpose for according immunity to international
organizations is to enable them to fulfill their chartered functions, it
followed that “most organizations would be unwilling to relinquish their
immunity without receiving a corresponding benefit which would further
the organization’s goals.”207 Because an organization was unlikely to
intend a waiver that could “significantly hamper” its proper functions,208
the court distinguished a waiver of immunity for commercial activities,
which would allow the World Bank to enter into contracts and agreements
by creating liability for breach, from an employment-based exception,
which would create liability without a corresponding benefit. For example,
the World Bank’s credibility as a guarantor of securities would be
meaningless without a right to sue to enforce the World Bank’s contracts.209
By comparison, a waiver of immunity for suits by employees over internal
operations presented no corresponding benefit and would actually harm the
World Bank’s ability to operate by subjecting its internal operations to the
199. 717 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
200. See id. at 612.
201. See id. at 615 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 464(1) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1983)).
202. See id.
203. See id. at 613–14.
204. See id. at 614.
205. See id. at 617.
206. See id. at 614.
207. See id. at 617.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 618.
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judicial scrutiny of a member state.210 Consequently, the court found that
the World Bank had not intended to limit its immunity to suits involving the
internal administration of its employees.211
5. Breaking the Silence: Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim
In the aftermath of Broadbent and Mendaro, the impact of the FSIA on
the IOIA remained unresolved for over a decade.212 Finally, in 1997 the
District Court for the District of Columbia provided the first explicit answer
when it heard an employee’s claims of assault and battery and intentional
infliction of emotional distress against the International Finance
Corporation (IFC) in Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim.213 The court ultimately
denied the IFC’s motion to dismiss, asserting that “the ‘same immunity’
language of the IOIA should be read to incorporate the changes to foreign
sovereign immunity enacted in FSIA.”214
The court began with a determination that the IOIA’s operative language
provided “broad” immunity for organizations at the time the Act was
passed.215 The court next highlighted that, since 1976, the FSIA has
provided the “sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign
government in a United States court.”216 As a result, the FSIA currently
defines the immunity of foreign states.217 The court further acknowledged
that the impact of the FSIA on the IOIA was an “unsettled question,” and
that the D.C. Circuit had so far avoided a decision because the international
organizations at issue had been immune from suit whether or not the FSIA
applied.218 But here, the court asserted that the IFC would not be entitled to
immunity under the FSIA because the suit fell within one of the Act’s
exceptions, and therefore, the court had to decide whether the FSIA applies
to international organizations like the IFC through the IOIA.219
The court recognized that there were “sound reasons” for affording
absolute immunity to international organizations.220 However, it found
itself ultimately “constrained” by the plain language of the IOIA.221 In
support of its holding, the court evoked the canon of statutory interpretation
210. See id. at 618–19.
211. See id. at 621.
212. See Herz, supra note 14, at 494.
213. See Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim, 932 F. Supp. 19, 19 (D.D.C. 1996).
214. See Herz, supra note 14, at 494–95.
215. See Rendall-Speranza, 932 F. Supp. at 23 (quoting International Organizations
Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b) (2006)).
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 24; see also Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610, 618 n.54 (D.C. Cir.
1983); Broadbent v. Org. of Am. States, 628 F.2d 27, 32–33 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
219. See Rendall-Speranza, 932 F. Supp. at 24.
220. See id. (citing Broadbent, 628 F.2d at 31–33, and listing the reasons as: (1) the FSIA
is generally silent about international organizations; (2) the IOIA permits immunity to be
modified by the President; and (3) that the policies that lead Congress to enact the FSIA may
not apply to international organizations).
221. See id.
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cited in Broadbent, that “[a] statute which refers to the law of a subject
generally adopts the law on the subject as of the time the law was invoked
. . . includ[ing] all the amendments and modifications of the law subsequent
to the time the reference statute was enacted.”222 Furthermore, the court
reasoned that Congress understood what it was doing when it passed the
FSIA and could have revised the IOIA to reaffirm the absolute immunity of
international organizations.223 Congress’s inaction signaled that the
restrictive immunity provided under the FSIA “was to apply in like fashion
to international organizations.”224
As a result of the district court’s decision in Rendall-Speranza, it
appeared that the D.C. Circuit would finally have to address the impact of
the FSIA on the IOIA. However, the circuit court again avoided a direct
ruling225—opting instead to dismiss the claim on procedural grounds—
thereby leaving the FSIA’s impact on the IOIA an open question.226
II. THE D.C. AND THIRD CIRCUITS SPLIT
Rendall-Speranza was not the last word, however; instead, two circuit
courts are currently split over the meaning of the IOIA’s “same immunity”
language. Part II examines this circuit split in detail. It begins with an
examination of the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Atkinson, which held that the
IOIA created a baseline absolute immunity standard. It then addresses the
Third Circuit’s decision in OSS Nokalva, Inc. v. European Space Agency,227
which held that the IOIA incorporated subsequent amendments to sovereign
immunity, including the FSIA.
A. The D.C. Circuit: Qualifying Absolute
The following discussion examines Atkinson, the D.C. Circuit’s first
direct ruling on the standard of immunity granted by the IOIA. It then
briefly examines two subsequent cases—one also from the D.C. Circuit and
one from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania—that reaffirmed and adopted
Atkinson’s holding.

222. See id. (quoting Broadbent, 628 F.2d at 31).
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim, 107 F.3d 913, 921 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
226. See id. at 919–21. The court found that the action did not relate back to the date of
the original complaint and was therefore barred by the statute of limitations. The court also
found that Nassim was immune from the battery claim, as he was acting within the scope of
his official capacity. See id. at 919–20. Further, because he was immune from the battery
claim, the battery could not be used to save the otherwise time-barred emotional distress
claim. See id. at 920. Therefore, the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against
Nassim was also barred by the statute of limitations and the whole action was dismissed. See
id. at 921.
227. 617 F.3d 756 (3d Cir. 2010).
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1. Absolute and Equivocal: The D.C. Circuit’s Decision in Atkinson v.
Inter-American Development Bank
In Atkinson, the D.C. Circuit court held that the World Bank was entitled
to absolute immunity under the IOIA from a garnishment proceeding
brought by the wife of a former employee to satisfy state judgments against
the husband for child support and alimony.228 However, in contrast to the
district court in Rendall-Speranza, the circuit court did not find the canon of
statutory interpretation to be conclusive; rather, the court highlighted
alternative theories in the IOIA’s legislative history and text that persuaded
the court that the IOIA was not tied to the FSIA.229
The court interpreted the IOIA’s “same immunity” language as
legislative shorthand for the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity and
consequently construed the phrase as a reference to the law governing the
immunity of foreign states.230 Therefore, the main issue according to the
D.C. Circuit was whether the 79th Congress intended the IOIA to refer only
to foreign sovereign immunity law as it existed in 1945, or to also
incorporate subsequent amendments including the FSIA.231 Importantly,
the court determined that foreign sovereigns enjoyed “virtually absolute
immunity” when Congress enacted the IOIA in 1945.232
The court then addressed the statutory canon upon which the district
court in Rendall-Speranza relied,233 finding that such a canon is only
appropriate where the statutory language is ambiguous.234 The court
acknowledged that the text of the IOIA provided no express guidance on
whether Congress intended the Act to adopt subsequent changes to
sovereign immunity.235 However, the court found that the IOIA’s emphasis
on Presidential oversight was persuasive evidence that Congress “was
228. See Atkinson v. Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, 156 F.3d 1335, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
229. See id. at 1340–41; Herz, supra note 14, at 495–96.
230. See Atkinson, 156 F.3d at 1340.
231. See id.
232. See id. (quoting Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983)).
The D.C. Circuit determined that foreign states had been entitled to absolute immunity under
U.S. law in 1945, “contingent only upon the State Department’s making an immunity request
to the court.” See id. However, this construction treats sovereign immunity as a single and
identifiable legal standard to be applied by the courts, with a possible advisory role to be
played by the State Department. See supra Part I.A(2). Instead, by 1945, absolute immunity
had clearly ceased to be the governing principle of foreign sovereign immunity in the United
States. See supra Part I.A(2). Even more importantly, Ex parte Peru and Hoffman had
transformed foreign sovereign immunity from a judicial inquiry into a political
determination made by the executive branch in accordance with U.S. foreign policy. See
supra Part I.A(2).
233. See supra note 222 and accompanying text. The canon holds that a “statute which
refers to the law of a subject generally adopts the law on the subject as of the time the law
was invoked . . . includ[ing] all the amendments and modifications of the law subsequent to
the time the reference statute was enacted.” Broadbent v. Org. of Am. States, 628 F.2d 27,
31 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.08 (Sands ed.,
4th ed. 1975); Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim, 932 F. Supp. 19, 24 (D.D.C. 1996).
234. See Atkinson, 156 F.3d at 1340–41.
235. See id. at 1341.
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content to delegate to the President the responsibility for updating the
immunities of international organizations in the face of changing
circumstances.”236 The court noted that the IOIA only applies to
organizations designated by the President and that the President retains the
power to withdraw or limit the immunity granted by the IOIA to
international organizations.237 Consequently, the court found that the
IOIA’s inclusion of an explicit mechanism for monitoring and updating the
immunities of international organizations “by appropriate Executive Order”
clearly undermined the claim that Congress intended the IOIA to be
automatically revised in accordance with developments in foreign sovereign
immunity law.238
In support of its position, the court pointed to the legislative history of
the IOIA. The court cited a Senate report, which characterized the
provision delegating authority to the President to modify an organization’s
immunity as “permit[ting] the adjustment or limitation of the privileges in
the event that any international organization should engage, for example, in
activities of a commercial nature.”239 The court noted that the report
clearly suggested that the responsibility for modifying the IOIA rested with
the President–acting through a formal proclamation or executive order and
not with a separate evolving body of law. Further, the court explained that
the delegation of authority was done with the foresight that international
organizations might engage in commercial activities.240
Consequently, the D.C. Circuit found that the IOIA accorded the same
immunity to international organizations as was enjoyed by foreign
sovereigns in 1945.241 Furthermore, the court determined that the 1945
standard operated as a baseline, defined as absolute immunity by the court’s
analysis of the history of U.S. foreign sovereign immunity law, which could
subsequently be modified only by a formal executive order altering
immunity under the IOIA.242

236. See id.
237. See id.
238. See id. at 1340–41.
239. See id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 79-861, at 2 (1945)).
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. See id. Despite the court’s emphasis on the role of the President under the IOIA, its
ultimate formulation of the IOIA’s application is problematic for several reasons. Besides
the fact that absolute immunity was no longer the standard for foreign sovereign immunity in
1945, see supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text, the court also failed to recognize any
role to be played by the State Department. See Atkinson, 156 F.3d at 1341. Instead, the court
distinguished Presidential orders from State Department determinations. See id. The court
read the President’s ability to amend the IOIA as granting that power to the President alone,
so that absent an executive order modifying the IOIA, international organizations would be
entitled to absolute immunity regardless of any other body of law, even if that law was
“heavily influenced by the President acting through the State Department.” See id.
Consequently, the D.C circuit in Atkinson granted the World Bank absolute immunity
despite the fact that the State Department had issued a formal statement in June 1980
recommending that—absent a specific, alternative suggestion—international organizations
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The court next looked to whether the FSIA was intended to modify the
IOIA. First, it dismissed the argument, put forth in Rendall-Speranza, that
by choosing not to revise the IOIA when it passed the FSIA, Congress
expressed its intent to apply restrictive immunity to international
organizations.243 The court’s response was that Congress did not express
its intent by failing to act and that, in any case, the will of a later Congress
is of little relevance to the meaning of a law enacted by an earlier
Congress.244 Second, the court addressed the claim that, by prohibiting
“attachment or any other judicial process impeding the disbursement of
funds [held by an IOIA-protected entity] to . . . a foreign state as the result
of an action brought in the courts of the United States,” the FSIA permits a
negative inference that funds held by an international organization could be
dispersed to a non-foreign state (such as a private individual).245 The court
rejected this interpretation, finding that, if anything, Congress intended to
clarify that international organizations deserved special protection.246
Therefore, the court determined that the FSIA had no impact on the
IOIA.247
The D.C. Circuit also addressed whether the World Bank had waived any
immunity it might be entitled to in defense of a garnishment action under
the IOIA.248 The World Bank’s charter provides: “Actions may be brought
against the Bank only in a court of competent jurisdiction in the territories
of a member in which the Bank has an office, has appointed an agent for the
purpose of accepting service or notice of process, or has issued or
guaranteed securities.”249 The court noted that it rejected reading an
identical provision as a blanket waiver of immunity in Mendaro.250
Instead, it again applied the corresponding benefit test to determine whether
the Bank’s charter should be construed as a waiver of immunity.251 In
doing so, the court reformulated the test to say that “the Bank’s immunity
should be construed as not waived unless the particular type of suit would
further the Bank’s objectives.”252 The court found that a waiver of
immunity from garnishment proceedings provided “no conceivable benefit”
should be limited to the same restrictive immunity as sovereign foreign states. See id. at
1341–43; supra notes 181–82 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III.A and III.C.
243. See Atkinson, 156 F.3d at 1342; see also supra notes 223–24 and accompanying text.
244. See Atkinson, 156 F.3d at 1342.
245. See id. (quoting Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1611
(2006)).
246. See id. The court emphasized that the passage comes within a list of exceptions
where the property of foreign states can be attached and therefore serves only to clarify that
these exceptions do not apply to property held by international organizations where there is a
foreign state judgment debtor. See id.
247. See id. at 1341–42.
248. See id. at 1337.
249. Agreement Establishing The Inter-American Development Bank art. 11, § 3, Apr. 8,
1959, 10 U.S.T. 3068, 389 U.N.T.S. 69.
250. See Atkinson, 156 F.3d at 1338 (citing Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610, 614–
15 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
251. See id.
252. See id.
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to the World Bank, unlike a waiver for commercial transactions, which
would allow an organization to perform the ordinary activities needed to
operate.253 Therefore, the court concluded that the World Bank had not
waived its absolute immunity against this suit.254
2. Living with Atkinson: Waiving Absolute Immunity Under the
Corresponding Benefit Test
In 2009, the D.C. Circuit reaffirmed its Atkinson holding in Osseiran v.
International Finance Corporation.255 In Osseiran, the IFC claimed
immunity under the IOIA in an action for promissory estoppel and breach
of confidentiality in a commercial transaction.256 The court did not
challenge the IFC’s claim that it was entitled to absolute immunity under
the IOIA, but instead found that it had waived immunity through its charter
under the corresponding benefit test.257 Examining the same charter
language that it had in Mendaro and Atkinson and following its own
arguments from those cases, the court reasoned that immunity from suits
based on commercial transactions would harm an organization’s ability to
fulfill its fundamental goals by hindering its capacity to operate in the
marketplace.258 By contrast, the court found that the IFC could identify no
countervailing costs to suggest that immunity should not be waived.259
Therefore, the court found that the IFC had waived its absolute immunity
under the IOIA for commercial transactions.260
In addition to the D.C. Circuit, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania also
followed the Atkinson holding. In BRO Tech Corp. v. European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development,261 the district court addressed a dispute
over an investment made in a Romanian corporation.262 The court
identified the major issue to be the level of immunity provided to the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (European Bank) by
the IOIA after the passage of the FSIA.263 In resolving the issue, the
district court explicitly “adopt[ed] the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit, and
[found] that the [European Bank was] entitled to absolute immunity under
253. See id. at 1338–39. Since Atkinson, the U.S. Supreme Court has clearly rejected the
“constructive waiver” theory. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 687 (1999). Writing for the majority in College Savings Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, Justice Scalia found that a state’s
entry into lawful activity could not be construed as a waiver of its usual. See id.; RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 927 (6th ed. 2009).
254. See Atkinson, 156 F.3d at 1338–39.
255. 552 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
256. Osseiran, 552 F.3d at 838.
257. See id. at 840–41.
258. See id. at 840.
259. See id.
260. See id. at 840–41.
261. No. CIV.A.00-2160, 2000 WL 1751094 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 2000).
262. See id. at *1.
263. See id. at *3.
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the IOIA, contingent on any waiver of that immunity.”264 The district court
then applied the D.C. Circuit’s corresponding benefit test and found that the
financial security provided by a waiver of immunity for commercial
transactions was necessary for the European Bank to attract investors.265
As a result, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that the European
Bank was entitled to absolute immunity, but had waived its immunity for
commercial dealings.266
B. A Canon Is a Powerful Weapon: The Third Circuit Adopts Restrictive
Immunity in OSS Nokalva, Inc. v. European Space Agency
Following more than a decade in which Atkinson was the authoritative
word on the immunity of international organizations, the Third Circuit—
weighing in on this issue for the first time—rekindled the debate when it
rejected the Atkinson interpretation in OSS Nokalva.267 The following
discussion examines the Third Circuit’s decision in that case and its holding
that the FSIA’s restrictive immunity does extend to international
organizations under the IOIA.268
OSS Nokalva concerned a breach of contract action brought by a software
developer against the European Space Agency (ESA).269 In response, the
ESA claimed that it was protected from the suit by the IOIA’s grant of
absolute immunity.270
In evaluating the effect of the FSIA on the IOIA, the court observed that
the “same immunity” language of the IOIA clearly showed that “Congress
was legislating in shorthand.”271 The result was to link the immunity of
international organizations to the immunity of foreign governments
provided by the FSIA.272 In so finding, the Third Circuit contrasted its
approach with the D.C. Circuit in Atkinson.273 The court recognized that
Atkinson had dismissed the importance of the reference canon and had
instead relied heavily on the President’s authority to regulate the immunity
provided by the IOIA.274 However, the Third Circuit found “nothing in the
statutory language or legislative history” to suggest that the President’s
authority under the IOIA precluded incorporation of subsequent changes in
sovereign immunity.275 According to the court, the Senate report cited in
Atkinson merely evidenced the kind of changes that the President could
264. See id.
265. See id. at *4.
266. See id. at *7.
267. OSS Nokalva, Inc. v. European Space Agency, 617 F.3d 756, 764 (3d Cir. 2010).
268. See id. at 765–66.
269. See id. at 758.
270. See id. at 760.
271. See id. at 762 (quoting Atkinson v. Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, 156 F.3d 1335, 1340 (D.C.
Cir. 1998).
272. See id.
273. See id. at 763–64.
274. See id. at 763.
275. See id.
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make, but was silent as to whether the immunity granted by the IOIA was
otherwise “frozen” in time.276
To support its interpretation, the Third Circuit pointed to the State
Department’s support for applying the same restrictive standard of
immunity provided under the FSIA to international organizations through
the IOIA.277 Furthermore, the court highlighted the fact that nearly half of
all international organizations designated by the President as receiving
immunity under the IOIA came into existence after Congress enacted the
FSIA in 1976.278 The court thus determined that it was illogical to grant
absolute immunity to those international organizations that first received
immunity under the IOIA after foreign sovereign immunity had already
been limited to restrictive immunity by the FSIA.279 Likewise, the court
found that it was unreasonable that a “group of states acting through an
international organization is entitled to broader immunity than its member
states enjoy when acting alone.”280 In addition, the court pointed out that
Congress could have expressly tethered the immunity of international
organizations to 1945 if it had actually intended the IOIA to be frozen in
time.281 However, without express language indicating such an intention,
the Third Circuit found that the IOIA should be interpreted in light of the
usual reference canon “to mean that Congress intended that the immunity
conferred by the IOIA would adapt with the law of foreign sovereign
immunity,” and therefore, that the IOIA incorporated the FSIA.282
Because the FSIA applied to international organizations, the court found
that the ESA could be held liable for breach of contract because the suit met
the FSIA’s commercial exception.283 The result was that the Third Circuit
affirmed the district court’s holding, denying the ESA’s motion to
dismiss.284
III. REREADING THE IOIA TO PROVIDE A FLEXIBLE STANDARD OF
IMMUNITY FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
The split between the D.C. and Third Circuits ultimately comes down to
a dispute over dates. In Atkinson, the D.C Circuit argued that the IOIA’s
reference to foreign sovereign immunity was frozen in time, so that
international organizations were entitled to the same level of immunity
276. See id. at 763 n.5; see also supra notes 239–40 and accompanying text.
277. See OSS Nokalva, 617 F.3d at 763–64. The court quoted the letter written by Robert
Owen, a State Department Legal Advisor, which read, “The [FSIA] amended [U.S.] law by
codifying a more restrictive theory of immunity subjecting foreign states to suit in U.S.
courts . . . . By virtue of the FSIA, . . . international organizations are now subject to the
jurisdiction of our courts in respect of their commercial activities.” See Owen Letter, supra
note 181, at 917–18.
278. See OSS Nokalva, 617 F.3d at 764.
279. See id.
280. See id.
281. See id.
282. See id. at 764–65.
283. See id. at 765.
284. See id. at 766.
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granted to foreign sovereigns in 1945.285 By contrast the Third Circuit
found that the IOIA was linked to the evolving doctrine of U.S. foreign
sovereign immunity law, and therefore, that the restrictive theory of
immunity adopted by the FSIA in 1976 applied to international
organizations.286 Thus, behind each circuit’s decision lies the same
determination: that the IOIA must be defined through a specific application
of U.S. foreign sovereign immunity law. However, a close reading of the
historical record does not support this conclusion. Instead, the evidence
suggests that when the IOIA referred to the “same immunity . . . as is
enjoyed by foreign governments,” it was not adopting a specific level of
foreign sovereign immunity; rather, it was referring to the process by which
a foreign government received its immunity.287 This interpretation not only
reflects the understanding that foreign sovereign immunity was a political
determination in 1945—rather than a specific legal standard—but more
closely comports with the statute when read as a whole.
Part III.A evaluates the Atkinson decision and argues that foreign states
were not entitled to absolute immunity in 1945. It also explains that the
corresponding benefit test is inconsistent with the IOIA’s requirement of an
express waiver. Part III.B turns to OSS Nokalva and explains that the IOIA
was not intended to reference foreign sovereign immunity as a body of law.
Finally, Part III.C proposes a new interpretation of the IOIA, wherein courts
would show deference to immunity determinations by the executive branch
for international organizations. In the short term, this new conception
would not disturb the general consensus that international organizations
should be held liable for commercial transactions. However, unlike the
current circuit decisions, it would allow the executive branch to alter
immunity levels when necessary for the security or interests of the United
States.
A. Shifting Standards and Missing Words: Reevaluating the
D.C. Circuit’s Decision in Atkinson
The following sections reevaluate the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Atkinson.
First, the assertion that foreign sovereigns were entitled to absolute
immunity in 1945 fails to take into account changes to U.S. foreign
sovereign immunity law in the 1930s and 1940s. Second, the application of
the corresponding benefit test to the IOIA is incompatible with the IOIA’s
requirement that waivers of immunity be express.

285. See International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b) (2006); supra
notes 241–42 and accompanying text.
286. See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
287. See 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b); supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text.
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1. Absolute Immunity Was Not the Standard for
Sovereign Immunity in 1945
In reaching its decision in Atkinson, the D.C. Circuit found that when the
IOIA was passed in 1945, foreign sovereigns were entitled to absolute
immunity.288 This initial conclusion informed the rest of the decision and
led the court to conclude that international organizations still enjoyed
absolute immunity unless they had waived their privilege either expressly
or through the corresponding benefit test.289 However, while sovereign
immunity had been virtually absolute for most of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the standard was markedly different by the time the
IOIA was passed in December 1945.290
For most of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, U.S. foreign
sovereign immunity law was common law set by federal courts.291 Under
this system, U.S. courts consistently granted absolute immunity to
sovereign foreign states for all of their acts, including those that were
commercial in nature.292 This practice began with The Schooner Exchange
and reached its height in the 1920s with Pesaro, when the Supreme Court
ignored a State Department recommendation and determined that foreign
sovereigns were entitled to absolute immunity for their public and private
acts.293 It is likely that the Atkinson court looked to this compelling history
when it determined that foreign governments enjoyed absolute immunity in
U.S. courts in 1945.294
Foreign sovereign immunity underwent a significant change, however,
between the start of the Great Depression and the end of World War II.295
During this time period, the Court gradually transitioned to a “realist”
approach that was more politically conscious, as well as deferential to
executive branch determinations in all matters of foreign policy.296
Specifically, in Ex parte Peru and Hoffman the Court effectively repudiated
Pesaro’s conclusion that a sovereign government could be entitled to
immunity without a positive determination by the executive branch.297
Consequently, by 1945, foreign governments no longer enjoyed absolute
immunity under U.S. law; rather, courts deferred to executive branch
(typically State Department) recommendations of foreign sovereign
immunity in specific cases.298 Therefore, if the IOIA was intended to
288. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 246–53 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 37, 43–44 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
292. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
293. See Berizzi Bros. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926); see also supra notes 30–
32 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text. The Third Circuit in OSS Nokalva
and the U.S. Supreme Court in Verlinden explicitly endorsed this conclusion, as both
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afford the same immunity as was extended to foreign states in 1945, it
could not have been intended to provide absolute immunity.
2. The Requirement of Express Waiver: Addressing the
Corresponding Benefit Test
While the D.C. Circuit determined that international organizations were
still entitled to absolute immunity under the language of the IOIA, it also
utilized the corresponding benefit test to determine when a constructive
waiver was appropriate.299 Specifically, in Atkinson the court hypothesized
that the corresponding benefit test would apply when international
organizations engaged in commercial transactions, because private parties
would be reluctant to trade without a legal remedy. Therefore, those
organizations must necessarily have intended to include a commercial
waiver in their charters.300
The problem with this test is fairly simple: necessary or not, you cannot
have an implicit, express waiver. The IOIA states that international
organizations are entitled to the same immunity as foreign governments,
“except to the extent that such organizations may expressly waive their
immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any
contract.”301 Therefore, the IOIA only allows for the express waiver of
immunity.302 Unlike constructive or implicit waivers, which can be
conveyed through actions or overall intentions, an express waiver is
generally understood to require a “clear and unambiguous” desire to waive
immunity, so that the waiver’s meaning is unmistakable.303 When a
balancing test and judicial inquiry is needed to determine whether an
organization intended to waive its immunity to a particular suit, such a
waiver is not unambiguous. Instead, where an organization has been found
to have immunity under the IOIA, that immunity has not been waived
unless the organization has demonstrated an unmistakable intent—such as
in a contract or other legal document—to surrender immunity for a given
transaction, activity, or specific suit.304
decisions acknowledged that by 1943, the Supreme Court deferred to executive branch
determinations when deciding sovereign immunity questions. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent.
Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983); OSS Nokalva, Inc. v. European Space Agency,
617 F.3d 756, 762 n.4 (3d Cir. 2010).
299. See supra notes 250–52 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
301. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
302. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. By comparison, the FSIA allows for both
express and implicit waivers of immunity. See Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976, 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2006). However, the D.C. Circuit found that the FSIA did not apply to
the IOIA. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
304. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected
the use of the “constructed waiver” theory to limit the sovereign immunity of U.S. states,
finding that a state’s entry into a lawful activity cannot be construed as a waiver of its usual
immunity, because such a practice amounts to coercion that destroys consent. See supra
notes 136–40, 253 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, the corresponding benefit test is not necessary for
organizations to properly function.305 Absent a general provision in the
charter, private parties are free to insist that an immunity waiver is
expressly included in their contract with the organization.306 Similarly, if
an international organization were to find a particular immunity
counterproductive, it could unilaterally waive that immunity either through
an express provision or by declining to assert immunity in court.307
B. OSS Nokalva Take-Two: Distinguishing the IOIA from
Foreign Sovereign Immunity
In contrast to the D.C. Circuit, the Third Circuit found that the IOIA was
a reference statute tied to U.S. foreign sovereign immunity law and thereby
adopted all subsequent amendments including the FSIA.308 However, the
conclusion that the phrase, “same immunity . . . as is enjoyed by foreign
governments” in the IOIA signaled the intention to adopt sovereign
immunity law, cannot be reconciled with the legislative history of the IOIA
and the purposes for granting immunity to international organizations.309
The following discussion explains why the IOIA was not intended as a pure
reference statute; rather, the immunity of international organizations was
intended to evolve separately from foreign sovereign immunity.
Congressional reports discussing the bill assert that the basic purpose of
the IOIA was to “confer upon international organizations . . . privileges and
immunities of a governmental nature.”310 Therefore, it was expected that
the privileges granted to international organizations would be “similar” to
those granted to foreign governments and their officials.311 The immunities
would not, however, be the same, because the purpose for granting
immunity to international organizations was different than that for granting
immunity to foreign sovereigns.312 Specifically, in considering the IOIA,
Congress relied upon a State Department assurance that the immunities
granted to international organizations and their officials would be “more
limited” than those extended to foreign governments.313 For example, the
immunity of officers and officials of international organizations would be
constrained to acts performed in their official capacity, whereas the
diplomatic officers of foreign nations enjoyed full immunity from legal
process.314
305. See supra notes 251–54 and accompanying text; see also Herz, supra note 14, at
520–21.
306. See Herz, supra note 14, at 520.
307. See id.
308. See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
309. See International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288 (2006); supra
notes 93–95, 298 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
313. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
314. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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These differences reflected two key factors. The first was that the IOIA
reflected different policy concerns than those behind the enactment of the
FSIA.315 The FSIA was passed in order to establish a default rule for
sovereign immunity that would apply equally to all foreign countries and
free the State Department from the political liability of its immunity
decisions.316 But, the purpose for granting immunity to international
organizations is to secure their legal and practical independence, so that
they could operate without undue interference by the laws of member
states.317
This concern was particularly relevant in relation to the United States,
whose role as the host nation for many these organizations left them
especially vulnerable to pressures by the U.S. government and suits under
U.S. law.318 In effect, the FSIA was passed to free the U.S. government
from pressure by foreign states, while the IOIA was passed to free
international organizations from intrusion by the United States.319
Specifically, the IOIA was passed to assure the international community
that suitable conditions were in place to protect the legal and practical
independence of these organizations from overly burdensome interference
when the United States was the host country.320 In exchange, the IOIA
served the self-interest of the United States by allowing it to host key
organizations like the U.N., protecting it as a member-nation from liability
for the organizations’ actions within the United States and strengthening the
position of other organizations of which the United States was a member,
but not the host nation.321
Another difference between the immunity of foreign governments and
that of international organizations is that Congress expected the executive
branch to manage immunity under the IOIA in a way that it explicitly
rejected in the FSIA.322 This different treatment is a reflection of the fact
that the United States is a member of any organization covered by the IOIA,
and therefore, immunity determinations under the IOIA involve different
pressures and concerns than those created by foreign sovereign immunity
determinations.323 Thus, rather than equating international organizations to
foreign nations, a more appropriate analogy might be to U.S. agencies.
Under U.S. law, federal agencies enjoy limited, functional immunity for
their acts.324 Under the Federal Tort Claims Act325 (FTCA), U.S. agencies
can generally be held liable for the negligent or wrongful acts of their
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

See supra notes 84, 96, 145 and accompanying text.
See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 101–04 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 146–47 and accompanying text.
See The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680 (2006).
See id.
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employees acting within the scope of their employment, but they maintain
immunity under the discretionary function exception for acts or omissions
caused by the policy decisions of an agency.326 In Dalehite v. United
States,327 the Supreme Court defined the discretionary function necessity
as, “the discretion of the executive or the administrator to act according to
one’s judgment of the best course . . . . Where there is room for policy
judgment and decision there is discretion.”328 This conception of immunity
is akin to the traditional understanding of the immunity of international
organizations under the functional necessity doctrine, by which
organizations enjoy those limited immunities necessary to provide
organizations with the independence and discretionary authority “necessary
for the fulfillment of their purposes,” without risking liability under the
laws of its member states.329
Moreover, the idea that Congress intended to grant the President
discretion to manage and, if necessary, to amend the immunity granted to
international organizations under the IOIA is clear from the historical
record. In recommending the bill’s passage, the House Committee on Ways
and Means found that the “interests of the United States are adequately
protected . . . [by the] broad powers granted to the President.”330 The IOIA
authorizes the President “to withhold or withdraw from any such
organization or its officers or employees any of the privileges, exemptions,
and immunities provided for in this title . . . or to condition or limit the
enjoyment by any such organization” of immunity.”331 According to the
legislative history, this language was intended to provide the President with
the powers necessary to rectify any abuse of the immunities granted by the
IOIA, including the ability to limit an organization’s immunity in “the event
that any international organization should engage . . . in activities of a
commercial nature.”332 Therefore, by granting the authority to withhold or
condition the immunity of international organizations to the executive
branch, Congress clearly established a complete mechanism for amending
the IOIA to reflect changes in domestic or international custom outside of
U.S. foreign sovereign immunity law.333

326. See id. § 2680(a). The FTCA also contains a limited number of additional
exceptions, such as for injuries sustained by military personnel in the course of their duties
and for intentional torts. See id. §§ 2671–2680.
327. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
328. See id. at 34, 36; HENRY COHEN & VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
95-717, FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 9 (2007).
329. See Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 464(1)
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 1983)); supra notes 8–11 and accompanying text.
330. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text.
332. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
333. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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C. Simple, Workable, and Flexible: Executive Determination of the
Immunity of International Organizations
The current interpretations of the IOIA and the immunity of international
organizations should be reworked. The D.C. Circuit’s absolute immunity
standard from Atkinson does not reflect the complicated reality of foreign
sovereign immunity law when the IOIA was passed in 1945.334 Likewise,
the Third Circuit’s proposal improperly treats the IOIA’s reference to the
immunity of foreign governments as an intention to adopt a particular level
of sovereign immunity and all subsequent amendments to that immunity,
rather than an allusion to the general type of immunity being conveyed.335
Instead, the “same immunity” reference of the IOIA should be read as
extending the judicial deference to executive branch determinations that
defined foreign sovereign immunity in 1945.336 Under this interpretation,
the FSIA has no direct effect on the IOIA. The following sections explain
this Note’s proposed interpretation of the IOIA.
1. The Proposed Standard Is Consistent with a Plain Reading of the IOIA
When the IOIA was passed in 1945, there was no single legal standard
for foreign sovereign immunity.337 The changes in the Supreme Court’s
approach to foreign affairs from 1938 through 1945 transformed the
immunity of foreign governments from a legal question answered by the
courts independent of executive branch recommendations, into a political
issue determined by the executive branch in accordance with U.S. foreign
policy.338 Therefore, when the IOIA granted the “same immunity . . . as is
enjoyed by foreign governments” to international organizations, it was not
referencing a body of law, whether fixed or evolving.339 Instead, the
IOIA’s reference to foreign governments reinforced the overall intention
that the immunity of international organizations should be determined
through a similar type of executive branch or State Department scrutiny as
was then applied to immunity requests by foreign states.340
This interpretation is consistent with a plain reading of the IOIA. Both
Atkinson and OSS Nokalva treated the “same immunity . . . as is enjoyed by
foreign governments” as the principal immunity language of the IOIA,
while the President’s authority to limit immunity was treated, like waiver,
as an exception. 341 Put another way, the interpretations offered by the D.C.
and Third Circuits read the IOIA as granting some specific level of foreign
sovereign immunity, which can be further limited either by waiver or by

334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 308–09 and accompanying text.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 56–60 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 56–60, 85 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 242, 248–53, 271–84 and accompanying text.
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Instead, courts should follow the natural
Presidential action.342
construction of the statute and treat section 1 of the IOIA as the principal
provision, which establishes that the President decides which organizations
get immunity and in what circumstances that immunity should be
withdrawn or limited.343 Section 2 then clarifies section 1 by defining what
is meant by “international organizations,” and signaling that the President
should apply the same type of analysis used to evaluate immunity requests
by foreign governments when determining the immunity of international
organizations.344
2. Current Executive Branch Determinations Would Hold International
Organizations Accountable for Their Commercial Activities
In addressing the effect of the FSIA on the IOIA, some scholars have
argued that there is an emerging consensus that international organizations
should adhere to the general principles and customs of international law,
including the theory of restrictive immunity.345 This conclusion is
illustrated by the D.C. Circuit’s concern in Atkinson that international
organizations be prevented from abusing their immunity when they engage
in commercial agreements with private parties.346 Therefore, an obvious
concern raised by the decision to transfer immunity determinations to the
executive branch is that international organizations would be freed from the
restrictions created either by the application of the FSIA or the
corresponding benefit test.
These concerns ignore the fact that the executive branch has already
expressed its opinion on the proper level of immunity that should be
extended to international organizations.347 The 1980 State Department
letter written by Robert Owen contained a clear statement recommending
that the same restrictive immunity conferred on foreign governments in the
FSIA should be applied to international organizations.348 Given that the
State Department has consistently maintained this position, it is almost
certain that if the judiciary were to show deference to immunity
determinations by the executive branch for international organizations,
those organizations would continue to be subject to the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts for their commercial activities.349
342. See supra notes 242, 248–53, 271–84 and accompanying text.
343. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
344. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. The same sentence of Section 2 that
refers to foreign governments also clarifies that any immunity granted to international
organizations also extends to “their property and their assets, wherever located, and by
whomsoever held.” 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b).
345. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 258–59 and accompanying text.
347. See Broadbent v. Org. of Am. States, 628 F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (discussing
an amicus brief submitted by the Justice Department); supra note 181 and accompanying
text.
348. See supra notes 181–83 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 181–83 and accompanying text; see also Broadbent, 628 F.2d at 31.
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3. The Proposal in Practice
Reinterpreting the IOIA to establish judicial deference to executive
branch determinations for the immunity of international organizations
would not be difficult or disruptive. As Hoffman illustrated, judicial
deference does not require a recommendation by the President for each and
every instance where immunity is asserted.350 Instead, the executive
branch, or likely the State Department, would only need to issue an official
determination when it wishes to depart from past policy; otherwise, courts
can look to previous statements and precedent to determine whether an
organization is in fact immune.351 Therefore, given the current statements
issued by the State and Justice Departments, adopting this new
interpretation for the IOIA would likely simplify litigation by establishing a
single, clear rule that international organizations are generally entitled to
only restrictive immunity.352
At the same time, the new interpretation proposed by this Note would
have the additional advantage of allowing the executive branch to play an
active role in immunity determinations and to depart from a strict,
restrictive immunity standard when necessary for U.S. security or
interests.353 This ability touches upon the core difference between the
immunity granted to foreign sovereigns and that extended to international
organizations—unlike immunity requests by foreign governments, the
United States has a direct investment in protecting international
organizations.354 The United States is a member of every organization
covered under the IOIA, and the immunity extended to these institutions
has a direct effect upon the United States and its national interests in a way
that the immunity of a foreign state never does.355 Therefore, adopting the
interpretation of the IOIA proposed by this Note would allow the executive
branch to actively monitor and protect both claims brought by its private
citizens and its interests as a member of the organization involved.
CONCLUSION
When the 79th Congress established that the IOIA would extend “the
same immunity . . . as is enjoyed by foreign governments,”356 to
international organizations, it was not referencing sovereign immunity as a
specific body of law.357 Instead, the purpose of the IOIA was to impose the
same judicial deference to the immunity determinations of the executive
branch and State Department, which defined foreign sovereign immunity
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See supra notes 55–60 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 55–60 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 181–83 and accompanying text; see also Broadbent, 628 F.2d at 31.
See supra notes 101, 104 and accompanying text.
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
See International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288a (2006).
See supra notes 47–60, 85 and accompanying text.
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after Ex parte Peru and Hoffman, on suits involving claims against
international organizations.358
Based on current statements and recommendations by the State
Department, adopting this reinterpretation of the IOIA would simplify
litigation by establishing that international organizations are only entitled to
a baseline of restrictive immunity.359 However, this interpretation also
offers an additional advantage, in that it would allow the executive branch,
acting through the State Department, to easily monitor the IOIA’s
application. It would also allow the executive branch, when necessary to
protect the interests of the United States, to adjust the immunity of
international organizations either generally or for a specific suit.360

358. See supra notes 56–60, 85 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 181–83, 352 and accompanying text; see also Broadbent v. Org. of
Am. States, 628 F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (discussing an amicus brief submitted by the
Justice Department).
360. See supra notes 1–5, 102–04, 353–55 and accompanying text.

